The Chilean economy is usually highly praised as having been successful since the imposition of Focusing on three episodes (1973-81, 1990-95 and 2008-13), we explore the underlying explanatory variables and some lessons for building "a role model for development".
Introduction
The Chilean economy is usually highly praised by IFIs, diverse political authorities and international analysts. A generalised view prevails that there has been "one" successful Chilean model since the imposition of neo-liberal reforms under the dictatorship of general Pinochet in 1973. However, the four decades that have subsequently elapsed include several sub-periods with different policy approaches and external environments, as well as notably diverse economic and social outcomes. Accordingly, there is neither one unique model nor only one outcome. Sometimes, Chile has performed closer to become a "model" for development, and at other times the opposite or something in between.
Economic development at least includes the production of goods and services and its distribution among citizens. Accordingly, we will explore how both have evolved along the last four decades, focusing on three quite different episodes, given that a role model case should be consistently achieving success in terms of both economic growth and its distribution.
In section I, a summary evaluation is presented of policies and outcomes during the four decades. Section II focuses on three episodes: one corresponds to the first half of the dictatorship, in 1973-81; a second one during the first years of return to democracy, namely 1990-95; and finally the period since the contagion of the global crisis, 2008-13. Section III concludes.
I. An Overview Of Four Decades
In the five governments under democracy , industrial or productive development policies have been largely absent, as they had been under the dictatorship; the Pinochet dictatorship had eliminated most of them in the early years of his regime. On the contrary, macroeconomic and social policies have underwent significant changes; in particular, the macroeconomic regime experienced notable contrasts among and within the periods 1973-81, 1982-89, 1990-98, 1999-2007 and 2008-2013 .
The first deep reforms were launched in 1973. This stage of the reforms was characterised by the implementation of a neo-liberal model in its purest and ideological form.
Trade and financial liberalisation practically free from prudential regulation, as well as the adoption of "neutral" economic policies --under the view that "always the market knows better"--were accompanied by massive privatisations. By 1981, success had been generally achieved in reducing inflation and eliminating the fiscal deficit inherited, albeit at the expense of the external balance, a highly appreciated exchange rate and huge external debt, while recording climbing financial savings yet a low investment ratio. The outcome was a banking and foreign exchange crisis with huge economic and social impacts in 1982, including a GDP drop of 14 per cent, high unemployment exceeding 30 per cent of the labour force and a significant increase in poverty, with a worsening income distribution.
The second stage of the dictatorship implied moves toward more pragmatic policies to overcome the effects of the deep crisis. It involved a series of foreign debt renegotiations, several policy interventions aimed at balancing the external deficit -such as tariff increases and "selective" export incentives-and the government's direct take-over of the collapsed financial system, before subsequently privatising it again when their balance sheets were in order; heavy public subsidies to banks and debtors represented to the Treasury some 35
per cent of annual GDP. At the end of this period, the economy had recovered, while income distribution had worsened even further than in the 1970s. During recovery, actual GDP grew vigorously, but after due consideration of the 1982 recession it emerges that average annual growth was 3 per cent or under in both halves of the Pinochet regime.
A third variant of the economic model began in 1990, during the return to democracy, when the Chilean economy faced the challenges of achieving a sustained high average GDP growth and serving the great social debt accumulated in the years of dictatorship. The formal slogan of the Concertación Democrática, a centre-left coalition of socialists and Christian democrats, was "change with stability" for achieving growth with equity in the socio-economic dimension of the programme of the new government.
There were significant reforms of the market model, strengthening the social component and correcting severe pro-cyclical failures of economic policies, including labour and tax reforms to improve social expenditure. In addition, substantive counter-cyclical changes in fiscal, monetary, capital markets, exchange rate and regulatory policies were implemented, aiming at a sustainable real macroeconomic environment (beyond inflation and fiscal balance under control, seeking an aggregate demand consistent with potential GDP and sustainable external balance and exchange rate).
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The new authorities considered these balances of the real economy crucial for development (meant as GDP growth with reduced inequality). One outstanding feature of this period was the regulation of the capital account, with a flexible reserve requirement (encaje), which was quite active in these years of large supply of financial flows to the emerging economies. The counter-cyclical active regulation helped to control the volume of inflows, shifting its composition to the long term and their allocation in productive investment; it provided space for monetary policy and avoided undue exchange rate appreciation and 1 Details are analysed in Ffrench-Davis (2010, chapter VIII) and Lefort and Lehmann (2003). 4 instability. The economy benefited from comprehensive real macroeconomic stability, which is meant to be development-friendly, although there was practically no room for direct industrial or productive development policies norfor direct support to SMEs.The constitution inherited from Pinochet and the strong ideological fashion against selective development policies represented two particular obstacles.
Owing to the reformed macroeconomic policies, most of the period's economic activity was close to potential GDP, which had only been the case in 1974, 1981 and 1989 during the dictatorship. It was in this reformed macro-environment that Chile expanded its productive capacity in a sustainable manner between 1990 and 1998, with actual and potential GDP growing in parallel at annual rates averaging 7.1 per cent, while also improving social indicators (table 1) . represented an extreme case due to the amplitude of the role granted to the market, the intensive privatisation of the means of production, sharp liberalisation of imports and the domestic financial markets, as well as the regressive changes imposed on social organisations. There was a determinant emphasis on the "neutrality" of economic policies, disregarding the high existing inequality, under the belief that the "market always knows better"
and provides equitable outcomes.
The initial concerns of Pinochet's government lay with controlling the acute macroeconomic disequilibria inherited, particularly a 700 per cent hyper-inflation recorded in 1973, with the reduction of a huge fiscal deficit assuming top priority.
In 1973-74, the government benefited from a very high copper price (by far the main export, by a public firm -CODELCO), which increased public revenue and the availability of foreign currency. While it was evident to independent observers that the price was unsustainably high, the revenue from copper exports was fully spent by the government paripassu with its collection. Economic activity significantly recovered in 1974, making use of installed capacity underutilised during the previous year. However, the price of copper sharply declined in late 
Figure 1
In 1975, the domestic capital market was fully liberalised under weak regulations (the "market knows"), import policy was moving toward free trade and taxes on profits had been drastically reduced, as well as public investment and real wages. Shortly after, the fiscal budget shifted to a surplus.
In the meantime, international capital markets had become highly liquid, seeking newer destinations for their supply, including several Latin American nations. By 1977, Chile had started to receive huge capital inflows, mostly bank loans. Indeed, given that the public budget was then in surplus, they reached the private sector. A passive or neutral public policy allowed inflows, which appreciated the exchange rate and increased domestic demand. 3 Naturally, the deepening exchange rate appreciation significantly contributed to the drastic decline in inflation by the early 1980s.
However, in parallel, trade liberalisation plus exchange rate appreciation encouraged 3 In 1979, Chile moved to the then known as "monetary approach to the balance of payments", which involved fixing the nominal exchange rate and determining that the money supply would only be increased (reduced) in response to purchases (sales) of dollars by the Central Bank. It is similar to the "currency board" adopted by Argentina in 1991 and that exploited in a dramatic crisis in 2002.
imports, which increased faster than exports, in a trend that continued for five years.
Unavoidably, foreign debt of the private sector was accumulating rapidly.
In parallel, actual GDP was fast increasing, even though output capacity was rising quite slowly. In fact, the difference was made by the reutilisation of the large output gap -as said, of 21% between actual and potential GDP--generated in the sharp 1975 recession. Thus, the macroeconomic environment involved high rates of underutilisation of productive capacity for several years. This persistent output or recessive gap was a main factor discouraging gross capital formation (Agosin, 1998; Ffrench-Davis, 2006; Solimano, 1990) .
Investment in new capacity
Naturally, when entrepreneurs are not using a significant part of their capacity, profits are lower and thus entrepreneurs have less liquid funds, all of which evidently discourage expanding their capacity. As a typical feature of financial crises, abrupt recessions being followed by gradual recoveries clearly have a significant negative incidence on productive investment, thus pressing downward the trend of GDP growth and the quality of employment.
Second, the financial reform (mostly implemented in 1975) gave way to a predominantly short-termist market with very high real interest rates charged on domestic loans.
In fact, the most common loan held a 30-day term, while the activities of public investment banks were curtailed and annual real lending interest rates of the banking system averaged 38
per cent (reflecting a quite "outlier" macro-price) in 1975-82.
Third, trade liberalisation-cum-exchange rate appreciation reduced the cost of imports, principally of consumer goods, with their domestic output being crowded-out. Liberalisation attracted investors in the production of exports with a much weaker force than the discouragement of domestic firms competing with imports, with a counter-expected drop in the share of tradables in GDP. 5 Additionally, large shares of bank lending were used by economic groups to purchase public firms being privatised (fewer in creating new activities), as well as by households purchasing imported consumer goods. Finally, financing productive investment through increased inflows was notably scarce. It is crucial who intermediates capital inflows, and those intermediated by foreign direct investors (FDI) represented a minority.
By 1981, success had been achieved in eliminating inflation, exhibiting a large fiscal surplus (implying that the external deficit was completely from the private sector) and a high actual GDP growth between the depressed 1975 and 1981. There was euphoria among the government, IFIs and large business firms, holding the view that Chile was experiencing "an economic miracle". 6 However, domestic vulnerability to the changing moods of financial markets had been created. Foreign borrowing had given rise to a domestic lending boom in an atmosphere of lax prudential regulation and supervision. Related-party auto lending rose rapidly, often with fictitious guarantees. The banks renewed loans (often on a 30-day term) and financed interest payments with new loans. Non-performing loans appeared low and the banks' profits high. Many loans were backed by stock and real estate, whose prices were inflated owing to the financial boom, as well as the mistaken belief that the Chilean economy would continue to grow at around 8 per cent a year (the actual trend of potential GDP was closer to 3 per cent).
Underlying these disequilibria, there was a severely mistaken diagnosis, led by the belief in market spontaneous self-regulating adjustments. Since it had achieved a fiscal surplus and external borrowing was being decided by private debtors and lenders, the government assumed that a foreign exchange crisis would never occur. Indeed, the government was reassured in this false assumption by the explicit and strong support of the International
Monetary Fund (Robishek, 1981) , ignoring that an unsustainable deficit could be generated in the private sector (Marfán, 2005) .
In 1981, bank debt per capita almost doubled the Latin America average. The current account deficit had risen to 21 per cent of GDP, with domestic savings having collapsed. Chile required growing net financial inflows quarter after quarter, which becomes increasingly difficult when the debt stock has been rising so much faster than income. It is evident that the probability of flows reversal sharply rises with an increase in the debt stock, size of amortisations and deficit on current account, as well as the consequent need for exchange rate devaluation. 
B. Counter-cyclical regulation of the capital account: 1990-95
After the great debt crisis, Latin America regained access to private capital inflows by the early 1990s. 7 Chile was one of the first to attract new funds and was among the countries facing the greatest supply of inflows in relation to its economic size.
With the return to democracy in 1990, the Chilean economy faced the challenges of achieving a sustained high average growth and serving the vast social debt accumulated during the dictatorship. There were significant reforms of the market model, including labour reforms (which restored several labour rights), a tax reform reintroducing taxes on profits eliminated by the dictatorship (which raised public revenue geared to improve social expenditure and the distributive effects of the tax system), and a substantive counter-cyclical reform in macroeconomic policies.
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In fact, the shadow of the great recession of 1982, including its negative impact on growth and equity, was quite present in the minds of the new authorities. Consequently, the top priorities for implementing macroeconomic policies were achieving sustained equilibrium in financial markets and the real economy, diminishing vulnerability to external shocks and improving employment. The macroeconomic reforms were implemented in the capital account, exchange rate, monetary and regulation policies, under the view that the equilibrium of the "real" economy was crucial for growth with equity; in parallel, care was taken of fiscal responsibility.
Chilean public policy in the first half of the 1990s represented a significant step towards The authorities also used exchange rate intervention to hold down its real appreciation to a level consistent with the external balance, as well as monetary sterilisation to keep domestic demand consistent with potential GDP. These and other counter-cyclical policies supported a development strategy that encouraged export growth and its diversification, as well as productive investment and employment.
Three other policies contributed to the success in managing capital inflows. First, there was a responsible fiscal policy, whereby permanent increases in social spending were financed with permanent new taxes. Consequently, Chile had a significant non-financial public sector surplus in 1990-97, averaging 1.8 per cent of GDP, which was used to reduce the large external liabilities generated during the 1980s crisis. The prudential fiscal approach included observing the regulations of a stabilisation fund for public copper revenues, which contributed to stabilising public expenditure and preventing excessive exchange rate appreciation. Of course, running a fiscal surplus does not guarantee financial stability; recall that the great 1982 crisis occurred despite Chile having had large fiscal surpluses.
Second, prudential banking regulations had been introduced in 1986 in response to the banking crisis of 1982-83. The democratic authorities effectively resisted pressures to weaken supervision when lobbying sectors argued that the system was sufficiently mature to selfregulate. This deterred capital inflows to trigger another domestic credit boom.
Third, authorities continually monitored aggregate demand and its consistency with productive capacity. Consequently, macroeconomic disequilibria were not allowed to accumulate. Some overheating occurred in 1991 and 1993, although the authorities conducted a downward adjustment in aggregate demand in due time. Chile was able to make active monetary policy with a significant interest rate differential with the US rate when needed for domestic equilibria, thanks to the policy space provided by the encaje.
The set of policies was highly successful, in the sense that during 1990-95 --and especially when the contagion of the tequila crisis spread in 1995--the current account deficit was moderate (2.3 per cent of GDP in 1990-95), its financing mostly involved long-term inflows, international reserves were enlarged, the total short-term external liabilities were held to a fairly low magnitude, 9 aggregate demand was consistent with potential GDP and the real exchange rate was kept at a sustainable level, as shown by the moderate deficit on current account financed by greenfield FDI. All these are conditions of comprehensive real macroeconomic balances. They would not have been feasible without regulating capital inflows, managed flexibility of the exchange rate (see Williamson, 2003) and pursuing an active monetary policy. 10 Strategic features of the policies used were in frontal contrast with the mainstream fashion of full capital account liberalisation and fully free or fully pegged exchange rate policy.
When the Mexican exchange rate crisis exploded in 1995, the Chilean economy proved immune to contagion with a vigorous growth in that year. In 1990-95, average GDP growth peaked at 7.9 per cent, with some improvement in income distribution (see table 1, above) and a sharp drop in poverty. The producers of GDP --labour and capital, the real economy--benefited from comprehensive real macroeconomic stability.
One main merit of the policies during 1990-95 is that Chile successfully resisted pressures of the fashion in US academia and IFIs, as well as the temptation to achieve a faster disinflation with an increased domestic absorption of capital inflows and at the expense of exchange rate appreciation and a larger external deficit. High productive investment was the main factor behind the outstanding sustained GDP growth. As empirical studies robustly show, given its irreversibility, private investment responds positively to real macroeconomic equilibria, whenever they appear to be sustainable (Agosin, 1998) . For real sustainability, it must fulfil two key conditions: first, effective demand has to be consistent with the productive capacity being generated; and, second, key macro-prices (particularly the exchange rate) must be consistent with a sustainable external balance (Ffrench-Davis, 2006 ). In the six-year period from 1990 to 1995, actual and potential GDP rose at similar rates, with the economy working close to the production frontier; namely, with a minor output gap and a sustainable external balance. Indeed, these are crucial ingredients of real macroeconomic balances. In 1996-97, Chile continued to record vigorous growth, with both output and investment remaining high. A determinant factor behind the record investment ratio was the high employment of productive capacity as shown. However, as previously mentioned, the macro economy was becoming vulnerable to changes in the international environment, with the appreciation of the exchange rate and rise of external deficit. As said, Chile did step back in 1996-98, albeit only to a middle-of-the-road position. While it did not dismantle regulations, it allowed a gradual weakening of their effects (Le Fort and Lehmann, 2003) ; accordingly, disequilibria were moderate after six years of counter-cyclicality and only a couple of years of soft pro-cyclicality.
Therefore, Chile had advanced towards development with the significant macroeconomic reform in 1990-95, with some stepsback in 1996-97, while it only had made minor progress with respect to productive development policies. Later, it gave up liberalising the exchange rate in 1999 and the capital account in 2001. Table 3 compares the average performance of GDP and wages in 1990 GDP and wages in -98 and 1999 GDP and wages in -2013 , marking a large contrast. The capital formation ratio is rather similar and suggests a sharp drop in the total factor productivity of the latter, partly associated with real macroeconomic instability.
C.Contagion, counter-cyclical response and imbalanced recovery in 2008-13
When In a few weeks, the recovery restarted. The high level of domestic demand, a consequence of the counter-cyclical policy of 2009, was further increased by reconstruction costs following the 27F earthquake. Given that installed capacity was significantly underutilised --despite the destruction caused by the earthquake and the subsequent tsunami 13 --the accelerated public expenditure was consistent with a move toward macroeconomic equilibrium (using capacity) as long as a recessionary gap prevailed.
Indeed, in 2010, reconstruction spending strongly contributed to reactivating domestic demand and thus actual GDP, without inflationary pressures. Of course, the recessive gap was being reduced during the adjustment period, increasing employment and stimulating capital formation, although there was no structural progress in the generation of GDP, manufacturing remained depressed and export diversification stagnated. It was rather the recovery effect. With which, employment and income distribution improved, albeit returning to the social achievements already conquered by the mid-1990s.
Actual GDP was increasing strongly until 2012, with an average 5.7 per cent annual rate over the three-year period. To avoid the repeated error of confusing sustainable growth with recovery of economic activity, it is necessary to measure performance from peak to peak. If growth is measured from the previous peak of 2007, actual GDP growth averaged 3.9 per cent, which is consistent with the fact that actual GDP only rose 4.1 per cent in 2013. The economy had reached full capacity and the 4.1 per cent reflected the fact that potential GDP growth was closer to that figure than to 5.7 per cent. It is similar to the 3.9 per cent growth of the previous nine year period (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) , but much lower than the 7.1 per cent recorded in 1990-98.
12 Ffrench-Davis (2014, ch. X, The Central Bank estimated that potential GDP had been reduced by 1 to 1.5 per cent by the earthquake and tsunami.Thus, to be accurate, adjustment must be made for the 27F destruction of capacity by adding those 1-1.5 percentage points for the loss of potential GDP, thus arriving at an annual average for growth of close to 4.1 per cent in the six-year period 2008-13. An additional adjustment could be made if it is assumed that the contribution of export volume to GDP growth would increase if world trade was normalised.
Moreover, average real wages and minimum wages had risen much slower during the fifteen years that followed since 1999 (see table 3 ).
Table 3
Slow economic growth and social indicators returning to achievements conquered almost two decades ago do not provide a "model" of development. However, there is more.
The transition from the recessionary gap to close to full employment and use of potential GDP undoubtedly reflects one essential macroeconomic balance. Nonetheless, macroeconomic equilibrium covers crucial dimensions other than inflation under control, including external and comprehensive fiscal balances. Therefore, to achieve sustainability, fiscal and external accounts must also converge to a sustainable balance when the recessive gap disappears.
Very early in the transition of actual GDP toward potential GDP, there was a significant exchange rate appreciation and new permanent public expenditures without the corresponding permanent fiscal income. As a result, when the recessionary gap disappeared in 2012 and early 2013, two macroeconomic disequilibria had emerged: (i) an outlier overvalued exchange rate;
and (ii) a public budget supported by a transitory high copper price. For several years, imports and fiscal expenditure were growing much faster than the quantum of exports and tax proceeds.
During 2009, the external sector regained a surplus due to jumps in the copper price.
Meanwhile, after having experienced a strong revaluation up to $435 pesos to the dollar in March 2008, the exchange rate underwent a sharp devaluation, reaching $650 by late 2008.
Then, it responded to the subsequent dominant expectation that Chile was emerging from the crisis. Consequently, there it brought a new trend toward appreciation, with the exchange rate having appreciated to $460 by mid-2011.
These intense fluctuations are in sharp contrast with the view that the exchange rate is a determinant variable for the allocation of resources for exporters and those competing with imports. Evidently, derivatives markets do not solve the obstacle that instability brings for decision-makers of irreversible investment; rather, this instability is quite detrimental to development. Table 4 presents disaggregated data for the recent cycle 2008-13. It shows that imports grew notably faster than GDP and exports for several years, with the gap financed by a high price of copper. Notwithstanding that high price --most probably a transitory high one 14 --the current account was exhibiting a deficit equivalent to 3.4 per cent of GDP in 2012-13.
Additionally, a previous trend towards some exports diversification had been stagnating (a sort of Dutch disease was at work).
Table 4
The fiscal disequilibria are also depicted in table 4. In this six-year period, GDP increased by 26 per cent, while fiscal expenditure rose 52 per cent, without any significant tax reform. The difference was covered by fiscal income from copper exports. 15 In fact, there is a dangerous dependence of public expenditure and private imports on a high copper price. Obviously, permanent expenditure already at work and other required to finance new public goods and inclusive productive development demand a substantive tax reform that collects in a progressive way.
In brief, the inflation rate had been notably moderate. In contrast, there have not been sustainable balances between (quantum) export supply and import demand, nor between permanent public expenditures and structural tax income, as well as between the evolution of aggregate demand and potential GDP. The real economy has responded with a modest 3.9 per cent average GDP growth, quite lower than the 7.1 per cent recorded in 1990-98.
III. Closing Remarks
One distinctive feature of neo-liberalism is its neglect of the implications of initial inequality and sectoral imbalances; of the heterogeneity in productive structures, among diverse economic agents, and in access to voice and power of different sectors; of the social and allocative 15 Real tax income from copper depends on both its real price and the costs of production, which have been increasing quite fast in real terms. Note that as the Chilean tax system is highly dependent on the VAT, tax revenue grows faster than GDP as the external deficit increases as happened in 2010-13. See Table 4 . 16 Based on the significant revenue from copper mining, the opponents of tax reform have claimed that there are "sufficient fiscal resources." They do so without examining the need to revise downwards sustainable revenue, with a "reasonable" trend estimate of copper prices.
implications of market segmentations; and of the difficulty of transparently transmitting information to diverse economic agents so that they can face comparable opportunities.
Ultimately, neo-liberalism underestimates the frequent presence of destabilising adjustment processes, lags and overshooting, as well as the incompleteness of markets and institutions in developing nations. These elements represent severe obstacles that prevent "neutral" and indirect global economic policies from being effective.
Excepting the first years of return to democracy in 1990, an output gap prevailed for most of the time. The Chilean economy has been out of real macroeconomic equilibria, with significant output gaps, with only in 1991-97, 2007 and 2012-13 operating close to potential GDP. Furthermore, a quite unstable outlier exchange rate has worsened trade performance.
The specific policies and approaches used in each of the three episodes were quite diverse, evolving from the extreme naiveté of the 1970s into the pragmatic approach of the early 1990s. The end of the century saw a move away from macroeconomic sustainability as authorities gave in to the temptation to move toward financial globalisation disregarding the severe underlying risks.
For both growth and equity, it is necessary to reach sustainable real macroeconomic balances. Beyond low inflation and fiscal responsibility, an exchange rate management functional for productive development and an active management of aggregate demand in levels consistent with productive capacity are also required. The recent performance has been deficient on both of these matters. In returning to macroeconomic policies for development, the regulation of speculative capital flows merits top billing among the list of actions for inclusive development.
Nonetheless, real macroeconomics is not enough. The 1990s experience was notably successful in growth with stability, although productive structures improved too mildly, as well as income distribution. It implied progress toward development, albeit in an incomplete manner.
For long-term sustainability, the economic agenda requires further deep reforms to "complete" long-term innovative financing for development (with pro-SMEs and pro-employment biases), labour training and technological innovation, among others.
The strong expressions of domestic discontent, present in recent years, can be interpreted as a reinforced message of the urgent need to design and implement coherent strategies and make major inclusive reforms to productive structures and public social and economic policies. The great challenge is to move towards comprehensive development with an increasingly inclusive and more equitable productive system. 
